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Abstract. This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the 
nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in 
decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in 
which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I 
review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised 
picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a 
neuroeconomic account of irrationality.  
1.  The Rational Animal In Philosophy, Economics and Psychology 
Human life is one long decision tree. (Sterelny) 
Rational agents display their rationality mainly by making decisions. Some 
decisions are basic (turn left or turn right), other ones concern more crucial issues (“to 
be or not to be”). Even abstinence is decision, as thinkers like William James or Jean-
Paul Sartre once pointed out. Since choice is central to life, it is not surprising that many 
disciplines attempt to properly characterize decision-making. Philosophy, psychology 
and economics, among others, all have different and sometimes conflicting views about 
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the nature of  decision-making and the conditions that make it rational. Reviewing 
different construal of decision will therefore illuminate the importance of 
neuroeconomics at the theoretical level. 
Philosophers since Aristotle have reflected on the normative features of 
decisions—what makes a decision rational or not. In philosophy of mind, the standard 
conception of decision-making equates deciding and forming an intention before an 
action (Davidson Essays on Actions and Events; Searle; Audi). According to many 
analyses, this intention can be equivalent to, inferred from or accompanied by, desires 
and beliefs. As Davidson explains,  
If someone acts with an intention then he must have attitudes and beliefs from 
which, had he been aware of them and had he the time, he could have reasoned 
that his act was desirable. (Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events 85) 
The decisions rational agents make are thus motivated by reasons. If Paul sends a 
manuscript to a publisher, his decision is explained by a desire to be read and a belief 
that sending the manuscript can lead to publication. Rational actions are explained by 
these reasons, the purported causes of actions. Beliefs and desire are also constitutive of 
rationality because they justify rational action: there is a logical coherence between 
beliefs, desires and actions.  
Rational decision-making is also a core concept in economics. According to a 
standard definition, economics is the “science which studies human behavior as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins 15). 
This definition shows the centrality of decision-making in economic science: since 
means are scarce, we should use them efficiently to accomplish our goals. The two 
branches of rational-choice theory, decision theory and game theory, specify the formal 
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constraints on optimal decision-making in individual and interactive contexts. Rational-
choice theory can be construed as logic of action. It specifies which logical conditions the 
preferences of an agent should meet in order to make her decision rational (see Baron, 
for an introduction). For instance, preferences must be transitive: if one prefers A to B 
and B to C, one must also prefer A to C, but should not prefer C to A. An individual agent 
facing a choice between two actions can make a rational decision if she takes into 
account two parameters: the probability and the utility of each action’s consequence. 
Multiplying the subjective probability by the subjective utility of an action’s outcomes 
allows her to find which action has the higher subjective expected utility. The 
philosopher’s belief-desire model is thus reflected in the economist’s probability-utility 
model: probabilities represent beliefs while utilities represent desires, at least according 
to the standard interpretation of decision theory.  
Game theory considers agents making decisions in strategic contexts, situations 
where the preferences of at least another agent must be taken into account. Decision-
making is represented as the selection of a strategy in a game, a set of rules that dictate 
the range of possible actions as well as the payoffs of conjoining actions. For example, in 
the prisoner’s dilemma, police officers hold in separate cells two individuals accused of 
robbing a bank. The suspects, Bob and Alice, cannot communicate with each other. The 
police officers offer them the following options: confess or remain silent. If one 
confesses—implicating his or her partner—and the other one remains silent, the first is 
freed and the other one receives a ten-year sentence. If they both confess, they will each 
serve a five-year sentence. If they both remain silent, they will serve only a two-year 
sentence. This situation can be represented as the following payoff matrix (Fig.1), where 
Bob’s payoff is in bold characters and Alice’s in italics.  
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Alice  
Confess Remain 
silent 
Confess (-5, -5) (-10, 0) 
Bob 
Remain silent (-10, 0) (-2, -2) 
Fig.1. Payoff matrix in the prisoner’s dilemma 
 
Assuming that Bob and Alice have common knowledge—everybody knows that 
everybody knows that everybody knows… ad infinitum—of both each other’s rationality 
and of the rules of the game, they should confess. Confessing gives you either freedom or 
a five-year sentence, whereas remaining silent brings either a two-year or a ten-year 
sentence. They will expect each other to make the best move, confessing, since the best 
reply to this move is also confessing. Even if they would be better off by remaining silent, 
this choice is suboptimal: should the other one confess, they risk a ten-year sentence. In 
other words, they should not choose the cooperative move. Although the prisoner’s 
dilemma is a bare-bones picture of strategic decision-making, its simplicity allowed 
generations of scholars to investigate the nature of strategy in economic, social, 
psychological, political, or even military contexts (see Poundstone for a historical 
review). 
Finally, decision-making is also a topic for experimental economics, behavioral 
economics, cognitive science and psychology (I will refer to these empirical approaches 
of rationality as ‘psychology’). Whereas philosophy and rational-choice theory focuses 
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more on normative or prescriptive issues, psychology is generally interested in the 
descriptive aspects of decision-making. Psychologists study how subjects make 
decisions, and on which mechanisms do they rely for making them. Their patterns of 
inference and behavior can then provide an empirical counterpart to rational-choice 
theories. In numerous studies, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman showed that 
decision-makers’ judgments deviate markedly from normative theories (Kahneman; 
Tversky; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky). Subjects tend to make decisions according to 
their ‘framing’ of a situation (the way they represent the situation, e.g. as a gain or as a 
loss), and exhibit loss-, risk- and ambiguity-aversion. For instance, they prefer a sure 
gain of $10 instead of 10% chance of winning $110, even if the second option’s subjective 
expected utility is higher.  
Psychological studies also showed that we are not as selfish and greedy as the 
common interpretation of rational-choice theory suggests. Experimental game theory 
indicates that subjects cooperate massively in prisoner’s dilemma (Ledyard; Sally) and in 
other similar games, such as the ultimatum game. In this one-shot bargaining situation, 
a ‘proposer’ (Alice) makes an offer to a ‘responder’ (Bob) who can either accept or refuse 
the offer (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze). Alice proposes to split an amount of 
money between them. If Bob accepts her offer, he keeps the amount he is offered and 
Alice keeps the rest. If Bob rejects it, both players receive nothing. According to game 
theory, rational agents must behave as follows: Alice should offer the smallest possible 
amount, in order to keep as much money as possible, and Bob should accept any 
amount, because a small amount is better than nothing. If there is $10 to split, Alice 
should offer $1 and keep $9, while Bob should accept the split.  
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The ultimatum game has been studied in many contexts by varying parameters 
such as culture, age, sex, the amount of money, the degree of anonymity, the length of 
the game, and so on (Oosterbeek, S. and van de Kuilen; Samuelson). Overall, results 
show a robust tendency: the game-theoretic strategy is rarely played, because people 
tend to make ‘fair’ offers. Proposers tend to offer about 50% of the amount, and 
responders tend to accept these offers, rejecting most of the ‘unfair’ offers (less than 
20%). Since the rules of the game are quite simple, subjects do not deviate from the 
optimal strategy because they do not understand it. Normal subjects seem instead to 
have a tendency to cooperate and to value fairness. A similar pattern of behavior is also 
apparent in the trust game. In this game, Alice has an initial amount of money she could 
either keep or transfer to Bob. If she transfers it to Bob, the amount is tripled. Bob could 
keep this amount, or transfer it (partially or totally) to Alice. Game theory predicts that 
either Alice should keep everything, or if she transfers any amount, Bob should keep all 
of it. Experimental studies have shown that players in Alice’s position invest about 50% 
of their money and get more or less what they invest (Camerer).  
Experimental approaches to rationality can thus be informative for theory, as they 
highlight two features of our practical rationality. First, our practical reasoning does not 
honor the axioms of game and decision theory. Second, morality might have been left 
out of the picture of strategic rationality so far. However, the study of decision-making is 
recently benefiting from another source of empirical inputs: neuroscience. When we 
make decisions, complex mechanisms inside our skulls process information and control 
our bodies. It was therefore predictable that, after psychology, neuroscience would 
contribute to the study of decision-making. In the next two sections, I briefly review 
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some studies in the field of decision neuroscience, and then analyze their consequences 
for the philosophical conception of irrationality.  
 
2. Neuroeconomics and The Brain 
The Rational Deliberator turns out to be a well-camouflaged Adaptive 
Responder 
(Clark 33) 
Neuroscience is the scientific study of the nervous system. Molecular, cellular, 
behavioral, and cognitive mechanisms are revealed through different means; functional 
imaging technologies study degrees of activation and locations; single-cell recordings 
analyze the activity of individual cells; lesion studies try to determine the function of 
certain brain areas by investigating brain-impaired subjects (see D'Esposito, for an 
accessible presentation); and computational neuroscience uses computer simulations to 
support or invalidate hypotheses about brain mechanisms (Eliasmith). Obviously, these 
researches should shed light on the nature of decision-making. Recently, a conjunction 
between the neuroscientific study of decision-making and experimental economics has 
led to the creation of a new field now called neuroeconomics (Glimcher; McCabe; Zak). 
Although many definitions of the field exist, I will limit myself to the one given by 
philosopher Don Ross: “the program for understanding the neural basis of the 
behavioral response to scarcity” (Ross 330). Ross’s definition connects clearly this field 
to the traditional endeavour of economics (cf. Robbins’s characterization of economics in 
first section).  
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Generally speaking, neuroeconomic research proceeds according to the following 
methodology: 
(1) Choosing a formal model of rationality, a decision- or a game-theoretic 
situation, and then deducing what decisions agents should make. 
(2) Testing the model behaviorally to see if subjects follow normative standards.  
(3) Identifying the brain areas and neural mechanisms that underlie choice 
behavior.  
(4) Explaining why subject follow/fail to follow normative standards 
Of course, many variations are possible at each step: the formal model may be an 
alternative theory, or tackle a question not addressed by rational-choice theory; subjects 
may be of different age, sex or cultural background, or they may be subjects who incur 
cerebral impairment, cognitive deficit, etc. Neuroeconomics research thus proceeds by 
comparing formal models with behavioral data, and by identifying neural structures 
causally involved in economic behavior.  
 
2.1  Homo Neuroeconomicus 
 
Neuroeconomics explains decision-making as the product of brain processes 
involved in the representation, anticipation, valuation and selection of choice 
opportunities. It breaks down the whole process of decision into mechanistic 
components: certain brain areas may represent the value of the outcome of an action 
before decision, other ones may represent the value of the action per se, and yet other 
ones may represent these values at the time of the decision. Although such dispersion of 
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data may appear confusing, economic psychology provides us with a useful framework 
for understanding the mechanics of rationality at the neural level in a coherent manner. 
Kahneman and his collaborators suggest that the concept of utility should be divided in 
subspecies (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin). While decision utility is important (the 
expected gains and losses, or cost and benefits), decision-makers also value experienced 
utility (the hedonic, pleasant or unpleasant affect), predicted utility (the anticipation of 
experienced utility) and remembered utility (how experienced utility is remembered 
after the decision, e.g. as regretting or rejoicing). Neuroeconomics should identify neural 
structures and processes associated with these variables or, if necessary, suggest another 
typology. This distributed account of utility, as I will call it here, is a useful tool for 
organizing the numerous findings in this burgeoning field.  
Neuroeconomics and the distributed account of utility can, for instance, provide a 
more precise explanation of loss-aversion, a robust finding in psychology. Subjects 
usually give to the loss of $10 a higher impact than a $10 gain. Tversky and Kahneman 
attribute this aversion to a bias in the representation of the values of gain and loss 
(Tversky and Kahneman). Instead of postulating abstract cognitive heuristics, 
neuroeconomics explains loss-aversion as the interaction of neural structures involved in 
the anticipation, registration and computation of the hedonic affect of a risky decision. 
The amygdala, a structure involved in fear, emotional learning and memory modulation, 
registers the emotional impact of the loss; the ventromedial prefrontal cortex predicts 
that a loss will result in a given affective impact; and midbrain dopaminergic neurons 
compute the probability and magnitude of the loss (Naqvi, Shiv and Bechara; Tom et 
al.). Subjects are thus loss-averse because they tend to have or already had a negative 
response to losses (experienced utility). When they expect a loss to occur (decision 
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utility), they anticipate their affective reaction (predicted utility). They might be also 
attempting to minimize their post-decision feeling of regret (remembered utility).  
Similar researches can also illuminate ambiguity-aversion. In many experimental 
settings, subjects have a strong preference for risky prospects (those for which the 
probabilities are known) over ambiguous one (those for which the probabilities are 
unknown). For instance, let’s imagine two decks of 20 cards. There are 10 red cards and 
10 blue cards in the first one (risky deck), while there is an unknown proportion of blue 
to red cards in the second one (ambiguous deck). Agents win $1 each time they pick a red 
card. Despite a 50–50 chance of winning in both cases, subjects have a marked 
preference for the risky deck. According to decision theory, there is no reason to prefer 
one deck to another, but neuroeconomic studies showed that in this case of decision 
under ambiguity, a stronger activation is found in many areas, especially the amygdala 
(Huettel et al.). Although decision theory treats ambiguity as a special case of risky 
decision-making,  ambiguous and risky decision-making are supported by two distinct 
mechanisms. It thus seems that ambiguity-aversion happens because people have a 
stronger negative affective reaction to ambiguity than risk.  
One of the most robust finding in neuroeconomics concerns decision utility, the 
calculation of cost and benefits. According to many findings, this process is realized by 
dopaminergic systems, a network of structures in ‘older’ brain areas highly involved in 
motivation and valuation (Montague and Berns; Berridge). Dopaminergic neurons 
respond selectively to prediction errors, either the presence of unexpected rewards or the 
absence of expected rewards. In other words, they detect the discrepancy between 
predicted and experienced utility. Moreover, dopaminergic neurons learn from their 
mistakes: they learn to predict future rewarding events from prediction errors, and the 
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product of this learning (a ‘behavioral policy’) can then bias action choice. 
Computational neuroscience identifies a class of reinforcement learning algorithms that 
mirror the activity of dopaminergic activity (Niv, Duff and Dayan; R. E. Suri and W. 
Schultz). It is suggested that dopaminergic neurons broadcast in different brain areas a 
reward-prediction error signal similar to those displayed by temporal difference (TD) 
algorithms developed by computer scientists (Sutton and Barto "A Temporal-Difference 
Model of Classical Conditioning"; Sutton and Barto Reinforcement Learning : An 
Introduction). These algorithms are plausible descriptions of neural mechanisms of 
decision-making implemented in dopaminergic systems. They are not only involved in 
basic reward prediction, such as food, but also with abstract stimuli like art, brands, love 
or trust (Montague, King-Casas and Cohen 420).  
It might seem unusual to understand decision-making from a reinforcement 
learning perspective. However, reinforcement learning is not stimulus-response 
association analogous to classical behaviorism, but is rather the learning of “how to map 
situations to actions (…) so as to maximize a numerical reward signal” (Sutton and Barto 
Reinforcement Learning : An Introduction 3). Reinforcement learning like TD entails 
prediction: prediction is a cognitive, computational notion, not a behavioral one like 
association. Reinforcement learning, as Selten once noted (16), is thus a basic mode of 
behavior that cannot be ignored by a theory of rationality.  
The main contribution of neuroeconomics to decision theory so far is a new 
picture of decision-makers as adaptive and affective agents. Homo Neuroeconomicus is a 
fast decider that relies less on logic and more on a complex collection of flexible neural 
circuits associated with affective responses. Everyday utility maximization is more about 
feelings and less about the objective outcome of a decision: we use emotions to 
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anticipate emotions in order to control our behavior toward a maximization of positive 
emotions and a minimization of negative ones. The neuroeconomic picture of individual 
rationality is thus affective through and through. 
2.2 Homo Neuroeconomicus Playing Games 
Neuroeconomics provides also new insights into the nature of strategic 
rationality. Here, the results suggest that strategic decision-making is again a highly 
affective business. Brain scans of people playing the ultimatum game indicate that unfair 
offers trigger, in the responders’ brain, a ‘moral disgust’: the anterior insula (associated 
with negative emotional states like disgust or anger) is more active when unfair offers 
are proposed (Sanfey et al.). Subjects experience this affective reaction to unfairness only 
when the proposer is a human being: the activation of the insula is significantly lower 
when the proposer is a computer. Moreover, this activation is proportional to the degree 
of unfairness and correlated with the decision to reject unfair offers (Sanfey et al. 1756). 
Beside the anterior insula, two other areas are recruited in ultimatum decisions: the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (hereafter DLPFC), involved in cognitive control and goal 
maintenance, and the anterior cingulate cortex, involved in cognitive conflict and 
emotional modulation. When an offer is fair, it seems normal to accept it: there is a 
monetary gain and no aversive feelings. When the offer is unfair, however, the brain 
faces a dilemma: punish the unfair proposer, or get a little money? The final decision 
depends on whether the DLPFC or the anterior insula ‘wins’: Sanfey and his colleagues 
found that the anterior insula is more active in rejections, while the DLPFC is more 
active in acceptations. The ACC, itself more active when offers are unfair, behaves as a 
moderator between the cognitive goal (more money) and the emotional goal (punishing). 
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Deciding to accept or reject an offer in the ultimatum game is a complex adjustment 
between multiple goals and values, a complexity that decision theory or the belief-desire 
model can hardly account for. 
Other studies indicate that in similar games where cooperation is common but 
unexpected by game theory, players enjoy cooperating, what economists refer to as the 
“warm glow of giving” (Andreoni). In the prisoner’s dilemma, players who initiate and 
players who experience mutual cooperation display activation in nucleus accumbens and 
other reward-related areas (Rilling et al.). In the trust game, where cooperation is 
common but not prescribed by game theory, players are ready to lose money for 
punishing untrustworthy players. De Quervain et al. found that both punishing cheaters 
and anticipating this punishment activate the nucleus accumbens, suggesting that 
‘revenge tastes sweet’ (de Quervain et al.). It follows that fairness, trust and cooperation 
are common because they have an intrinsic value: even donating to societal causes elicits 
the same rewarding effect (Moll et al.).  
When humans interact with computers, however, these social emotions 
disappear. In all the aforementioned experimental games, human and computer 
partners do not elicit the same neural-affective reactions (Rilling et al.). Human partners 
induce positive or negative emotions, while computer partners induce much less 
affective reactions. Since computers do not entertain moral values, cultural norms and 
social emotions like normal flesh-and-bone individuals do, they do not feel the ‘warm 
glow’ of cooperation, the ‘sweet taste’ of revenge or the ‘moral disgust’ of unfairness. 
Consequently, a selfish attitude toward an emotionless machine is not seen as morally 
dubious, just as we do not feel cheated by it.  
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To sum up, social neuroeconomics shows that money is not the only currency in 
social exchange. A one-dollar gift is pleasurable, but a one-dollar offer in the ultimatum 
game elicits negative reaction if the proposer is a human.  
 
 
3. Neuroeconomics and irrationality 
Studies in neuroeconomics are apt to provide meaningful explanations for choice 
behavior. Loss-aversion and cooperation, oddities from the rational-choice theorist point 
of view, now make sense as patterns of inference and behavior that follow naturally from 
the affective dynamics of decision-makers. If rationality is a normative, evaluative 
concept, one might argue that a theory of decision-making mechanisms can hardly draw 
a distinction between rational and irrational decisions. Or can it? 
Classical models of rationality in fact suffer from the exact same problem. As Sen 
observed, every choice is said to reveal preferences:  
The reduction of man to a self-seeking animal depends in this approach on 
careful definition. If you are observed to choose x rejecting y, you are declared 
to have “revealed” a preference for x over y. Your personal utility is then 
defined as simply a numerical representation of this “preference,” assigning a 
higher utility to a “preferred” alternative. With this set of definitions you can 
hardly escape maximizing your own utility (…). (Sen 322) 
Philosophical theories of rationality that consider rational all those actions explained by 
beliefs and desires also face this problem. Whatever theory one might choose, a decision 
can always be described as the product of practical reasoning, whereby the agent infers a 
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choice from her beliefs and her desires. This problem is not particular to 
neuroeconomics.  
In order to escape a tautological account of rationality, it is important to 
distinguish external and internal assessment of rationality. An external assessment of 
rationality is an evaluation of the effectiveness of a rule or procedure. It assesses the 
optimality of rules in achieving certain goals. An internal assessment of rationality is an 
evaluation of the coherence of intentions, actions and plans. An action can hence be 
rational from the first perspective but not from the second one, and vice versa. 
Gambling, for instance, can make sense only from the gambler’s point of view: despite 
knowing that the odds are against her (thus externally irrational, if the goal is money 
maximization), she trades losses (decision utility) against the pleasurable feeling of 
gambling (experienced utility).  
The same reasoning can also apply to neural mechanisms discovered by 
neuroeconomics. Once precise mechanisms are spelled out, their optimality can be 
evaluated (external perspective) and their coherence made explicit (internal 
perspective). From an external perspective, TD algorithms plausibly represent decision-
making processes (Montague), both from a descriptive and a normative point of view. 
Descriptively, TD models closely mimic human, monkey and bee choices (Montague et 
al.; Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer; Egelman, Person and Montague). Normatively, these 
models achieve good performance in tasks that require information-processing under 
uncertainty, such as Backgammon, spatial delayed response tasks and autonomous robot 
navigation (Suri and Schultz; Perez-Uribe). In the same vein, making a fair offer in the 
ultimatum game is also a good strategy: offering a $5/$5 split entails a sure gain of $5, 
while offering a $1/$9 entails a sure loss. Therefore, from the external perspective, the 
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optimality of neural mechanisms can be assessed, and careful studies can draw a 
distinction whether, in a particular environment, such-and-such mechanism is effective. 
TD-learning, for instance, is effective under radical uncertainty, but is beaten by classical 
rationality under risk.  
 From an internal perspective, neuroeconomics studies show how externally 
irrational choices can be internally rational. Loss-aversion and ambiguity-aversion are 
not optimal under decision theory, but neuroeconomics shows that loss- and ambiguity-
averse subjects are rational in the internal sense, because they try to minimize negative 
feeling (elicited by amygdala activation). In this sense, it can be rational to maximize 
experienced utility, based on predicted utility. Loss-aversion can also be internally 
rational because preferring a sure decision is a way to minimize the painful feeling of 
loss and the post-decision feeling of regret. Various studies indicate that a loss of money 
can elicit negative emotional response (Delgado, Labouliere and Phelps), and that 
avoiding an aversive event can generate rewarding signals in the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Kim, Shimojo and Doherty). A loss-averse agent maximizes experienced utility before, 
during and after decision. Similarly, players in the ultimatum game and prisoner’s 
dilemma also behave rationally: they maximize positive feelings by being fair and 
minimize negative ones by avoiding or punishing unfairness. A responder (in the 
ultimatum game) accepting an unfair split would experience moral disgust, and would 
be happier from punishing the unfair proposer than from accepting the offer. One of the 
strengths of neuroeconomics is a more accurate description of subjects’ preferences: 
instead of inferring preferences solely from behavior, imaging and lesion studies allow 
inferences from brain functioning.  
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Are agents hence always internally rational, and always have good reasons 
(maximizing positive feelings, minimizing negative ones)? As Davidson suggested, 
accounting for irrationality requires partitioning the mind into subparts with a high 
degree of internal structures, potentially causing genuine internal conflict between 
values, judgments or motivations (Davidson "Problems of Rationality"). Explanations of 
practical irrationality such as akrasia (not acting on one’s own best judgment about 
what to do) reveal conflicting motivations: I want to finish my homework, I know it is 
the best thing to do, but instead I watch Casablanca on TV, even though I know it is not 
the best decision. With the distributed account of utility, one might identify several ways 
to be irrational. A perfectly rational agent would be an agent whose decision, predicted, 
experienced and remembered utility would always be in agreement. Any mismatch 
between these types of utility could be a variety of irrationality, and neuroeconomics 
could describe the interactions between different utility-maximization mechanisms. 
When decision utility is higher than predicted utility, for instance, some mechanisms 
inside the agent value the outcome of the decision more highly than others that predict 
an inferior utility. Drug addiction works exactly along the lines of this ‘irrational pursuit’ 
(Berridge): dopaminergic neurons ‘hijacked’ by drugs overvalue the drug rewarding 
effect, even if prefrontal areas involved in affective prediction do not anticipate a positive 
hedonic effect. This interaction betweens different processes may explains why addiction 
often seems internally irrational (its external irrationality is more obvious). John 
Cheever’s narration of his alcoholism in his Journals illustrates the incoherence between 
decision and utility, both predicted and experienced: “[d]rink, its implements, 
environments, and effects all seem disgusting. And yet each noon I reach for the 
whiskey bottle (Cheever 54). In his case, although the decision utility of drinking does 
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not coincide with its predicted and experienced utility, these two types of utility are here 
in agreement: Cheever both anticipates and experiences disgust. In other cases, we are 
irrational when predicted and experienced utility mismatch. Gilbert and Wilson coined 
the term ‘miswanting’ to describe the shortcomings of affective forecasting (the 
prediction of emotional impact). A perfectly rational agent, at time t, would choose to do 
X at t+1 given what she expects her future valuation of X to be. Many studies showed 
instead that people are subject to many biases that cause miswanting. For instance, 
people overestimate the length or intensity of the emotional impact of negative events: 
they recover from tragic incidents faster than they anticipated, and get used to pleasant 
effects. For instance, almost everybody imagines that being richer implies being happier. 
Research in psychology indicates, to the contrary, that 
[p]eople with above-average income are relatively satisfied with their lives but 
are barely happier than others in moment-to-moment experience, tend to be 
more tense, and do not spend more time in particularly enjoyable activities. 
(Kahneman et al. 1908) 
As of today, neuroeconomic research does not explain all these prediction biases, 
but research progresses in this direction. For now, we know that neural circuits involved 
in affective forecasting are not the same as those involved in experienced utility 
(Berridge). A thorough neuroeconomic explanation of miswanting would show how 
certain mechanisms bias affective forecasting and lead to disappointment. As a matter of 
a fact, neuroeconomics follow the Davidsonian conception of irrationality: partitioning 
the mind in sub-personal circuits (Ross 45) 
4. Conclusion 
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Philosophy, economics and psychology have already analyzed and enriched our 
conception of decision-making. Neuroeconomics, while still in its infancy, has already 
started to produce empirical results relevant to philosophy of science, philosophy of 
mind, moral philosophy and other theoretical approaches of rationality. It can enrich the 
debate on the relevance of folk-psychological categories such as belief and desire; it 
challenges the idea that there cannot be a science of rationality; it proposes a causal-
mechanistic account of decision-making; it shows that judgments of value are highly 
affective; and finally, it is a first step toward a naturalistic account of rationality. By 
breaking down utility-maximization into subspecies (experienced, decision, predicted, 
remembered), and by identifying the brain processes and circuitry that maximize these 
types of utilities, neuroeconomics offers a finer description of decision-making than 
rational-choice theory or psychology alone. Neuroeconomics is a fertile ‘trading zone’ 
(Thagard) for interdisciplinary exchange between economics, neuroscience, psychology, 
anthropology, and computer science in the years to come. 
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